Denver Journal of International Law & Policy
Volume 39
Number 1 Winter

Article 11

January 2011

A New State in the 21st Century: Kosovo's Path to Independence
Alonit Cohen

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp

Recommended Citation
Alonit Cohen, Book Note, A New State in the 21st Century: Kosovo's Path to Independence, 39 Denv. J. Int'l
L. & Pol'y 169 (2011)(reviewing Henry H. Perritt, Jr., the Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of
the Ahtisaari Plan (2010).

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

A NEW STATE IN THE 2

1

sT CENTURY:

Kosovo's PATH TO INDEPENDENCE
Reviewed by Alonit Cohen*

HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE FOR Kosovo:

A

CHRONICLE

OF THE AHTISAARI PLAN (2010).

In THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE FOR Kosovo: A CHRONICLE OF THE AHTISAARI
PLAN, Professor Henry Perrittexplains the Kosovar Albanians' desire for a state
of their own and the process they, and the world, went through to get it. This book
review will first introduce the history of Kosovo. This will be followed by a
summary of Professor Perritt's description of the negotiations between Kosovo
and Serbia and the legal issues considered; the plan that the negotiation team
proposed to the Security Council and the Security Council'sfailure to implement
it; and Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. Finally, this
review will discuss the weaknesses of the book, noting that Professor Perritt'stone
and lack of sources leave the reader questioning whether the book presents an
unbiased account of the dynamic and controversialevents that occurred

I. THE RECENT HISTORY OF Kosovo
Kosovo declared independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008, in
accordance with the Ahtisaari Plan and with the support of the United States, most
members of the European Union, and tens of other states1 The dynamic and
violent history of this region in the last century, which led to Kosovo's declaration
of independence, began when Kosovo became an "administrative region" of Serbia
during the Kingdom of Yugoslavs between the world wars. After WWII, Kosovo
had a similar status within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).2
SFRY was made up of six republics: Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro,

*University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, J.D. expected in 2011; University of Denver, Korbel
School of International Service M.A. in International Studies expected in 2011. Ms. Cohen worked in
Serbia from 2005 to 2008 and in Kosovo for the summer of 2010. The author thanks Professor Cynthia
Alkon for recommending the book, her family for their support, Carrie Golden for her insight, and the
author's friends in Serbia and Kosovo who have helped her to understand the conflict, as well as the
true meanings of peace, freedom, and the strength of the human spirit.
1. Dejan Anastasijevic, Joy in Kosovo, Anger in Serbia, TIME, Feb. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1714164,00.html; see ABA RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE,
LEGAL PROFESSION REFORM INDEX FOR Kosovo, 5 (vol. III 2009), available at http://www.abanet.

org/rol/publications/kosovo lpri vol iii 05 09 en.pdf.
2. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, YUGOSLAVIA: A COUNTRY STUDY (Glenn E. Curtis ed., 1992),

http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+yu0012).
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Serbia, and Slovenia; and two autonomous regions within Serbia: Kosovo and
Vojvodina. Under the 1974 SFRY constitution, Yugoslavia gave Serbia's
autonomous regions an increased limited sovereignty over their police forces,
courts, and civil institutions.3 However, in May of 1989, Slobodan Milosevic was
elected president of Serbia, and immediately started reducing these freedoms.4 As
President, Milosevic controlled the Yugoslav People's Army during the violent
break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990's, during which around 200,000 civilians
were killed through ethnic cleansing and genocide.5 In 1997, Milosevic stepped
down as Serbia's president, in order to serve as the President of greater
Yugoslavia. Just a year later, the conflict in Kosovo would begin.
In the second half of the 20th century, Kosovo had a large ethnic majority of
Kosovar Albanians, and a much smaller minority of ethnic Serbs. In 1989,
President Milosevic introduced a system of martial law in Kosovo and stripped
much of its political autonomy.6 He instituted a policy of ethnic Serb dominance
in industry, policymaking, teaching, the law and its enforcement.7 Throughout the
1990s, young male Kosovar Albanians formed a guerrilla force, known as the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), to oppose the Serbs.8
The KLA guerrilla forces initiated attacks against the Yugoslav National
Forces in early 1998, to fight for the freedom of the Albanian Kosovars from
Serbian oppression.9 The Yugoslav National Forces responded by purposefully
committing acts of ethnic cleansing against the Kosovar Albanians.10 For the next
year, NATO met with the Serbian government intermittently in an attempt to halt
the atrocities in Kosovo. At the same time, NATO provided evacuation and relief
aid to the Kosovar refugees. 1 In March of 1999, after the intensity of the attacks
on civilians increased, United States Ambassador Richard Holbrooke
independently met President Milosevic to persuade him to stop the attacks in
Kosovo or face imminent NATO strikes. 12 When President Milosevic refused,
NATO made the unanimous decision on March 23, 1999 to enter the region on
behalf of the endangered civilians.13 "The Alliance want[ed] to stop further
3. ABA RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, LEGAL PROFESSION REFORM INDEX FOR Kosovo, 5 (vol. III

2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/rol/publications/kosovo lpri vol iii 05 09 en.pdf.
4. Olga Nikoli6, Sefovi Srbge i Jugoslavqe od 1987 do 2000 [Heads of Serbia and Yugolsavia
from 1987 to 2000], GLAS JAVNOSTI, Sept. 18, 2000, http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.rs/arhiva/2000/09/18/
srpski/PO0091701 .shtm.
5. CAROLE ROGEL, THE BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA 37 (1998).
6. ABA RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, supranote 3.
7. ABA RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, supranote 3, at 5, 7.

8. Id. at 5.
9. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA: HUMANITARIAN LAW

VIOLATIONS INKosovo (vol. 10 1998), http://www.hrw.org/reports98/kosovo/ (follow "Violations of
the Rules of War by Government Forces" hyperlink).
10. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, ETHNIC CLEANSING IN KOSOVO: AN ACCOUNTING 5, 9 (2d report
Dec. 1999), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human rights/kosovoii/pdf/kosovii.pdf.
11. NATO's Role In Kosovo: Historical Overview, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION
(July 15, 1999), http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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serious, systematic human rights violations and prevent a humanitarian catastrophe
in Kosovo. 14 NATO forces, entirely airborne, commenced a bombing
campaign
15
against the Yugolsav National Forces that lasted seventy-eight days.
On the final day of the bombing campaign, the United Nations (UN) Security
Council adopted Resolution 1244 which demanded the end to all violence and
repression by Yugoslavia in Kosovo and the withdrawal of all forces. 16 Russia,
Serbia's close ally, sent its envoy Viktor S. Chernomyrdin to inform President
Milosevic that "he had no choice but to accept the West's demands" and President
Milosevic pulled his troops out of Kosovo. 17 In addition, Resolution 1244
authorized member states of the UN to establish two organizations within Kosovo:
an international security presence, Kosovo Force (KFOR),18 and an international
civilian presence, known as the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). 19
UNMIK would act as a "transitional administration while establishing and
overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions
to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo. 2 °
Under UNMIK, this international civilian presence was authorized to facilitate "a
political process designed to determine Kosovo's status., 21 At the time, the United
Nations expected that Kosovo's "status" eventually would return to that of a region
within Serbia.22 However, the United States and the majority of Kosovo expected
otherwise.23
From 1999 to 2004, UNMIK aided the Kosovar Albanians in creating a
government and society for themselves, through civil administration,
democratization and institution building, reconstruction and economic
development, and humanitarian assistance. However, it did not begin the process
of determining Kosovo's final status of whether it would become an independent
nation or return to Serbia as a province until 2004.24 In the meantime, KFOR
14. Press Release, Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroder (Mar. 24, 1999), reprinted in HEIKE
KRIEGER, THE Kosovo CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYTICAL DOCUMENTATION 1974
- 1999 399 (2001).
15. ROGEL, supra note 5, at 80.
16. S.C. Res. 1244, 3, U.N. Doc S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
17. Richard Bourdreaux, With Surrender, Milosevic Now Must Face the Music at Home, L.A.
TIMES, June 4, 1999, at 2, http://articles.latimes.com/1999/jun/04/news/mn-44060/2. By the end of May
1999, NATO estimated that 5,000 Kosovar Albanians had been killed as a result of ethnic cleansing,
and 1.5 million people had been expelled from their homes. NATO's Role In Kosovo: Historical
Overview, supra note 11. Milosevic was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in the Hague in 2002 for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo, as part of an
amended indictment that originally included his crimes in the previous Croatian and Bosnian wars. He
died in 2006 before a verdict could be reached. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, et al., Case No. IT-99-37-I,
Third Amended Indictment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 19, 2002).
18. S.C. Res. 1244, supranote 16, at 7.
19. Id. at 10.
20. Id.
21. Id at 11(e).
22. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE FOR Kosovo: A CHRONICLE OF THE

AHTISAARI PLAN 64 (2010).
23. Id at 63.
24. Id at 79-80, see id. at 91.
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maintained general security, although violent disputes between ethnic Albanians
communities and ethnic Serb communities occasionally erupted.
II.

SUMMARY OF THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE FOR

Kosovo

A. The Negotiations
Professor Perritt begins his book by narrating the 2004 riots initiated by the
Kosovar Albanians in Pristina, Kosovo's capital.
Kosovar Albanians were
frustrated with UNMIK's oversight and delay in the final status negotiation
process that had been called for in Security Council Resolution 1244, five years
prior. On March 16, 2004, Kosovar Albanian youth responded by destroying
UNMIK vehicles and attacking the homes of Serbs with rocks and fire. 26
According to Professor Perritt, the violent riots were the healthy catalyst to start
the international negotiation process, which began in February of 2006 in Vienna,
with direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina representatives. 27
UN Resolution 1244 required UNMIK to facilitate a political process
regarding Kosovo's status. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan selected former
Finland President Maarti Ahtisaari to direct the negotiation process because of his
strong negotiation background in Africa, Asia, and the Balkans.28 Professor Perritt
portrays the negotiations as Serbia pursuing hard line policies and unrelenting
power over Kosovo. 29 Professor Perritt also describes Kosovo's lack of diplomacy
at the beginning of the negotiations, and how the U.S. and European countries
strongly controlled Kosovo during the negotiations.30
The negotiation team and the parties met jointly to discuss the delicate issues
of decentralization (creation of municipal governments); "minority rights" (rights
of the Serb communities in Kosovo); the "right of return" (Serbs rights to return
from northern Serbia to their homes in Kosovo); and protection of religious sites.31
Compromises were difficult to come by, and rarely, if ever, occurred.3 2 The most
difficult negotiations were over the final status of Kosovo, where no real progress
was ever made.33 Although the rounds of negotiations failed, Professor Perritt
commends President Ahtisaari and his team for their role in creating the "Ahtisaari
Plan. 34 The plan, after almost fourteen months of failed negotiations between
Kosovo and Serbia, was presented to the Security Council on March 26, 2007."5 It
detailed a process for creating the independent state of Kosovo and the
development of international oversight in the region. However, international

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 5-11.
PERRITT, supra note 22, at 121.
Id.at 81,145.
Id. at 111-13.
Id.at 144.
Id. at 145, 158.
See id.
at 145-52.
Id.
Id. at 157-60.
Id. at 159-60.
Id. at 165.
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politics, supported by international legal concerns, immobilized the Security
Council, which never voted to enact the plan.
B. Legal Issues in the Negotiations
Professor Perritt explains that the legal premises behind Serbia's (and
Russia's) argument for the return of Kosovo to Serbia were that (1) today's
international system supports state sovereignty, and (2) Resolution 1244 did not
recognize potential independence for Kosovo.36
Rather, Resolution 1244
recognized the need to return the region of Kosovo to Serbia.3 7 Since 1945, new
states have achieved statehood when republics and federations broke up (such as
the USSR) or former colonies separated from their colonial state. In addition, no
state formed since 1945 has been admitted to the UN over objections from its
original overarching state.38 Allowing a portion of a state to secede over the
objection of its larger state is against international norms.39 Kosovo was never
considered a republic with the right to secede from Yugoslavia, rather it was an
autonomous region within the Republic of Serbia.4 ° If the UN allowed Kosovo to
become independent, this would go against the international legal norm of the last
sixty years that prohibits unilateral secession.4 1
Professor Perritt states that Kosovo's legal arguments for an independent state
were that 1) Serbia forfeited the right to govern Kosovo during the war; 2) Serbia
continued to relinquish sovereignty when it did not take governmental control over
the territory of Kosovo after the war; and 3) that Resolution 1244 applied only to
the interim arrangement for Kosovo, not final status.42 According to the emerging
international legal norm responsibility to protect, if a state fails to protect its
citizens, an international or foreign military may enter into the sovereign
territory.43 Thus, Serbia forfeited the right to govern Kosovo when it failed to
protect its Albanian citizens in the 1999 war, and in fact, actually committed
crimes against its citizens." In addition to Serbia forfeiting its right to govern in
1999, sovereignty and statehood depend upon a government's ability to exercise
control over the territory of the State.45 Serbia continued to ignore its governing
role for the Albanian majority living in Kosovo (98% of the population), and
UNMIK and KFOR exercised effective control over the region.46 Thus, Serbia

36. PERRITT, supra note 22, at 121.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
PERRITT, supra note 22, at 121-23.
Id. at 121; see also INTERNATIONAL

COMMISSION

ON

INTERVENTION

AND

STATE

(2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/reporten.asp; RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE GLOBAL MORAL COMPACT FOR THE 21'S CENTURY (Richard
H. Cooper & Juliette V. Kohler eds., 2009).
44. PERRITT, supra note 22.
45. Id. at 123.
46. Id.
SOVEREIGNTY,
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Finally, according to the Kosovar

Albanians, a close reading of UN Resolution 1244 showed that the words
"autonomous," "self-administration" and "self-government" applied to the interim
situation in Kosovo, but did not apply to the future status of the region.48
C. The Failureof the Security Council
The most novel aspect of the book is its discussion of the dichotomy between
the successful creation of the Ahtisaari plan and Security Council's failure to
implement it. The Secretary-General of the UN established the negotiation team to
aid in the final status talks between Kosovo and Serbia. The talks themselves, over
a period of fourteen months, failed. 49 However, President Ahtisaari created a plan
for the UN that would give Kosovo independence, allow for continuing
international oversight and peacekeeping forces in the region, and establish a
system to protect the Serb minority living within Kosovo.5 ° Unfortunately, the UN
did not act on the recommendation because of a deadlock in the Security Council.51
Russia, in an effort to wield its political strength while holding the presidency of
the Security Council, would not bring the plan to a vote, and would likely have
vetoed the plan based on Serbia's legal arguments, had it been put to vote at a later
date.52 This allowed other smaller countries to follow suit, pledging not to support
the recommendation. If the Security Council's role is to prevent war and promote
peace, then by not acting on the Ahtisaari plan, the Security Council failed.53
Regardless, because Kosovo declared unilateral independence with the backing of
the United States and most of Europe, Professor Perritt acknowledges that state
interests can
circumvent the Security Council, at least when powerful states are
4
involved.1
III. CRITIQUE
A. Professor Perritt'sTone
In the first twenty pages of the book, Professor Perritt startles the reader when
he describes how he, as the Dean of Chicago-Kent College of Law, lied to get
visas for a group of faculty and students to travel to Kosovo in December of 1998
(as well as lying to get their rental car).55 This was during the time when the
refugee problem was escalating, and the KLA and Serbian forces were fighting one
another in civilian areas.5 6 Then he "pestered the UNHCR" (UN Refugee Agency)
into taking himself and the students to a KLA stronghold where they could see the
action.57 There is no question that humanitarian support is important during such a
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 166, 164.
Id. at 178.
See id. at 178-79, 192-93.
Id. at 275-76.
PERRITT, supra note 22; see id. at 183.
PERRITT, supranote 22, at 41.
Id.
Id. at 43
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crisis, but in this case, Professor Perritt took law students through a war zone to
administer "aid"- setting-up internet on a few computers in the UNHCR office in
Pristina.58 Although the reader may be surprised by Professor Perritt's judgment, it
is also important to note that this story illustrates that he has first hand knowledge
of Kosovo in the late 1990's that he contributes to the book.
1. Supporting Documents and Sources
The story of the negotiations and the inner thoughts of the negotiating team
should be bolstered by additional sources. While the results of the negotiations are
publically accessible, the negotiations themselves were held behind closed doors.
Professor Perritt seems to have a deep knowledge and understanding of what
happened in the negotiations, but his numerous citations to anonymous sources and
interviews leave the reader wondering how he gathered information to write this
book. Moreover, the reader must accept blindly that these anonymous sources
were impartial. There is no doubt that many sources would feel uncomfortable
divulging information on record that may portray top-level politicians in a negative
light. Regardless, it is difficult not to be wary of first hand interviews conducted
under complete anonymity. For example, Professor Perritt described the Serbs'
strategy of "delay, destabilize, divide, and discredit" without a single citation or
explanation of how he could have gathered that information.59
2. Possible Bias or Inaccuracies
Professor Perritt adamantly supports Kosovo's independence, which seems to
lead him to portray some of the events concerning Serbia with less accuracy.
Crucial details in the descriptions of events concerning Serbia are sometimes
missing. For example, Professor Perritt comments on the widespread Serbian
nationalism and violent behavior by explaining how at the "Kosovo is Serbia" rally
in Belgrade, five days after Kosovo declared independence, "150,000
demonstrators got out of control and set fire to the U.S. and British embassies in
Belgrade, ransacked the McDonald's again, and looted stores. 60 However, most of
the international news coverage of this incident suggests that Professor Perritt's
account is incorrect. Rather, news sources state that up to 150,000 Serbs marched
peacefully from the parliament building in Belgrade to an orthodox church about a
mile away in an effort to show democratic peaceful resistance toward Kosovo's
declaration, while only up to one thousand young men separated from the peace
march to riot and attack the embassies. 61 There is no question that there are violent

58. Id. at4l-42.
59. Id.
at 127.
60. Id. at218.
61. The most widely held view is that the attack was carried out by a fringe of staunch
nationalists, many of them poor and from Serbia's rural heartland, whose economic disillusionment,

coupled with raw and real anger over Western backing of Kosovo's independence, has boiled over into
violent opposition to the United States and the European Union, which are viewed as the architects of

the "false state"). See Interview by Amy Goodman with Liljana Smajlovic, Editor in Chief, Politika
(Feb. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.democracynow.org/2008/2/22/report from belgrade s
erbiansprotestersset; All Things Considered:Rioters Burn Vacant U.S. Embassy in Belgrade (Feb 21,
2008) (downloaded using iTunes), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story
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Serb nationalists, but Professor Perritt leaves out the crucial detail that the majority
of Serbia approached Kosovo's declaration of independence in a democratic way.62
Noting that Professor Perritt never cites to a specific Serbian source throughout the
whole book, these details leave the reader questioning whether Professor Perritt
accurately portrayed the facts concerning the Serbs and their actions throughout
the whole final status process.
B. Professor Perritt'sPromotion of the Ahtisaari Process
Professor Perritt concludes that, "For once in the Balkans, political
transformation occurred through international diplomacy without prolonged
violence as a stimulus. The hope is that the Ahtisaari and Troika processes provide
a model that will be followed in the future. 63 This conclusion is surprising,
considering that Professor Perritt described the failure of the diplomatic efforts in
the negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia, and then the failure of international
diplomacy to convince the Security Council to approve the plan. A new country of
two million people declared unilateral independence because of the failure to
achieve a solution through international diplomacy. Thus, it seems inappropriate
to hope that the Ahtisaari process should be used as a model in the future. While
the Kosovar Albanians did achieve independence, it was in spite of this model,
rather than as a result of it. A stronger argument would be to use the responsibility
to protect as a model in future conflicts. The emerging international norm first
appeared in 1999, to aid in the support of NATO intervention into Kosovo. In the
future, this norm could discourage a State from attacking its own citizens, knowing
that its actions could result in a loss of sovereignty in the region.
The ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE FOR KoSovo is recommended for those who
want to understand the generalities of peace negotiations, the process and struggles
of achieving a new state in the 21t Century, and Kosovo's path to independence.
However, because Professor Perritt's detailed knowledge of the Kosovo-Serbia
negotiations is uncorroborated, readers should find additional sources to verify any
specific information.

.php?storyld=19246285; PBS Newshour: US Embassy Attacked in Protest Over Kosovo Independence
(Feb. 21, 2008) (downloaded), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/janjune08/belgrade 02-21.html; Dan Bilefsky, Serbia Seeks Rioters Who Set Fire to the U.S. Embassy,
N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 24, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/world/europe/
24serbia.html
62. Id.
63. PERRITT, supranote 22, at 272.

